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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
COMMERCIAL LAW-A Farmer Is Not a "Merchant"
Under the Uniform Commercial CodeCook Grains, Inc. v. Fallis*
Plaintiff grain company allegedly entered into an oral contract
to purchase 5,000 bushels of soybeans from the defendant farmer.
The grain company signed a written integration of the alleged oral
agreement and mailed it to the farmer, with a request for his signature. The farmer neither signed the document nor attempted to
communicate with the grain company and later refused to deliver
the soybeans pursuant to the terms of the plaintiff's memorandum.
In an action for breach of contract, the grain company contended
that the farmer was precluded from relying on the statute of frauds,
as incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code,1 by virtue of
his failure to object to the company's memorandum of the agreement.2 The trial court, however, allowed the statute of frauds defense, and, on appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, held,
affirmed. 3 A farmer is not a "merchant" as that term is used in the
Code and consequently, he is not obliged to give notice of an objection to a ·written confirmation of an oral agreement.
Section 2-201(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that
"a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is
not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made
between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought .... " An exception to this general provision is made
for dealings between merchants in section 2-201 (2) which states that
"if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements. of ... [the statute of frauds] against such party unless written
notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is
received." In giving special treatment to merchants, the Uniform
Commercial Code has borrowed a concept that had its genesis in
the common law. 4 Perhaps it is for this reason that the court in the
• 395 S.W.2d 555 (Ark. 1965) [hereinafter cited as principal case].
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-201(1) [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.J. The u.c.c.
was adopted in Arkansas in 1961 • .ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85 (1961 Addendum).
2. u.c.c. § 2-201(2).
3. Principal case at 557.
4. The Official Comments to U.C.C. § 2-104 explain that merchant, as defined in the
U.C.C., has its roots in the "law merchant" concept, which was a body of law developed in England and on the Continent to regulate the business dealings of merchants
and mariners. See generally BEWES, THE ROMANCE OF THE LAw MERCHANT (pt. 1)
(1923); SANBORN, ORIGINS OF THE EARLY ENGLISH MARITIME AND COMMERCIAL LAW
(1930). Special provisions for merchants were also found in the predecessor of the
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principal case looked to the common law in determining whether
farmers have been traditionally classified as merchants. 15 The court,
however, failed to recognize that the word "merchant" is incorporated in the Code as a term of art and it is given a specific definition
which is not entirely coincident with the common law or commonly
accepted definition of the term. Regardless of the wisdom of the
drafters of the Code in describing a professional in business by a
word which suggests to many a corner storekeeper, 6 the decision in
the principal case, by failing to examine the Code's purpose in formulating a higher standard of commercial conduct for merchants,
only adds to the confusion.7
A merchant is defined by section 2-104 as a "person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out
as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." The official comments to that section set
forth three criteria to be used in determining whether a given individual, in a particular situation, is to be held to the standards of a
merchant: professionalism, special knowledge, and commercial experience.8 In light of these three criteria, it would seem that the
court in the principal case should have concluded that the defendant
farmer was a "merchant" within the meaning of section 2-201(2).9
The first criterion focuses on the professionalism of the individual. The writers of the official comments point out that the casual
or inexperienced buyer or seller is not to be held to the standards set
for the professional in business.10 That the defendant was a profes-

u.c.c., the Uniform Sales Act. E.g., UNIFORM SALES Aar §§ 15(1), 15(2), 16(c). See
generally Trisdale, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Law of Contracts,
39 N.D.L. R.Ev. 7 (1963).
5. Principal case at 557. Quoting from 27 WORDS AND PHRASES 136 (1961), the coun
cited In re Rl!gsdale, 20 Fed. Cas. 175 (No. 11530) (D. Ind. 1876) and Dyett v.
Letcher, 29 Ky. (6 J.J. Marshall) 541, 543 (1831).
6. Judicial decisions which have attempted to give the term merchant its ordinary
meaning reflect the connotations commonly associated with that term. E.g., Seeley v.
Helvering, 77 F.2d 323, 324 (2d Cir. 1935) ("He is a middleman in distributing the
goods"); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. City of Broken Bow, 184 Okla. 362, 363, 87 P.2d
319, 321 (1939) ("A merchant is one who buys to sell, or buys and sells, goods or
merchandise in a store or shop''): White v. Commonwealth, 78 Va. 484, 485 (1884)
("[A merchant is] a dealer in goods, wares, and merchandise, who has the same on
hand for sale and present delivery'').
7. See Hall, Article 2-Sales-"From Statutes to Contract"?, 1952 WIS. L. REV. 209,
212; Rabel, The Sales Law in the Proposed Commercial Code, 17 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 427,
431 (1950).
8. U.C.C. § 2-104, comments I and 2.
9. The commentators that have considered the farmer-merchant question have
generally agreed that a farmer can be a merchant under the Code. However, they
have not specified the particular merchant provisions that should be applicable to
farmers, nor have they explained which aspect of the merchant definition encompasses farmers. See Hall, supra note 7, at 212; Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed
Code, 16 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 3, 15 n.50 (1951); Waite, The Proposed New Uniform
Sales Act, 48 MICH. L. REv. 603, 618 &: n.20 (1950).
10, u.c.c. § 2-104, C9tmnent 1.
,

December 1966]

Recent Developments

347

sional as opposed to a casual or inexperienced seller of farm products is evidenced by the extent of his fanning operations. The defendant testified that he was born and raised on a farm, and that in
1960 he had begun farming a 550 acre tract, 325 acres of which were
used for growing soybeans. The value of one year's soybean crop,
which covered only sixty per cent of his available acreage, was about
$12,700. 11 On the basis of this evidence, the conclusion seems inescapable that the farmer was a professional in the growing and marketing of soybeans and was, therefore, the type of individual with
which the merchant provisions of the Code are concerned. Although
the size of the defendant's operation warranted the conclusion that
he was a professional, one who has a small land holding and who
markets his products less frequently would not automatically be
adjudicated a merchant. A case by case determination12 of which
particular farmers are to be deemed merchants is in no way inconsistent with the Code's goal of uniformity13-all those who are found
to be merchants are treated equally, but inclusion in the class is to
be determined upon an examination of individual situations.
The second criterion focuses on the reasonableness of charging
a given individual with the specialized knowledge of the goods or
practices involved in his particular line of trade. 14 Actual knowledge
is not requisite; it is sufficient that the individual merely create the
impression of familiarity with the particular goods or practices. It
should also be noted that the drafters of the Code did not intend to
distinguish the marketing of crops from the sale of other products
that are more readily associated with the generic term "goods." Indeed, the Code specifically provides that growing crops are within
the definition of the general tenn.15 The defendant's experience in
farming and the size of his operation should warrant the conclusion
that he did possess the specialized knowledge of both the goods and
the practices of the soybean market so as to make him a merchant
in this respect.
Finally, to be a merchant, it is necessary that the individual have
some expertise with regard to the particular trade practice in question.16 Again, the individual need not actually have acquired this
expertise, but only be in a position where it would be reasonable
to assume that he had acquired it. In the principal case, the practice
at issue was the answering of a memorandum received in the mail
confirming an oral contract. The writers of the official comments to
11. Letter From Elton A. Rieves, III, to the Michigan Law Review, June 6, 1966.
12. See generally Comments to U.C.C. § 2-104.
13. U.C.C. § l-102(2)(c).
14. u.c.c. § 2-104(1).
15. U.C.C. § 2-105(1). See also U.C.C. § 2-107(2).
16. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2, states: "(A] lawyer or bank president buying fishing
tackle for his own use is not a merchant." This comment suggests that a person can
be a merchant with respect to some transactions and not others.
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section 2-104 evidently believed that almost everyone has sufficient
business expertise in the practice of answering mail to qualify as a
merchant with respect to this trade practice:
Sections 2-201(2), 2-205, 2-207 and 2-209 dealing with the statute of
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda and modification rest
on normal business practices which are or ought to be typical of and
familiar to any person in business. For purposes of these sections
almost every person in business would, therefore, be deemed to be
a "merchant" under the language "who .•. by his occupation holds
himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
. . . involved in the transaction . . ." since the practices involved
in the transaction are nonspecialized business practices such as answering mail.17

It is evident from the above, that, concerning the exception to the
use of the defense of the statute of frauds, the term merchant was
intended to be interpreted broadly. The purpose underlying this
exception was to make persons participating in business transactions
responsible for informing other parties of their intentions regarding contracts. It would not seem too great a burden upon the farm.er
in the principal case to require him simply to answer his mail. Certainly, if he enters the market each year to sell his products, he can
and should be held to the same standard of conduct applied to
others conducting their business in that market. As the comment
quoted above suggests, a given farmer may be considered a merchant
as to those practices of which he has specialized knowledge or some
expertise, without being held to the standards· of a merchant in
other business dealings with which he is unfamiliar. In the principal
case, the court's categorical holding that farmers are not merchants,
went much farther than was necessary to decide the issue before itwhether the farmer was a merchant regarding the practice of answering mail-and, in so holding, the court apparently overlooked
the intended flexibility of the merchant provisions incorporated in
the Code. 18
As suggested above, almost every individual in business would
be considered a merchant with respect to those Code sections which
deal with the statute of frauds, 19 firm offers,20 confirmatory memoranda,21 and contract modification22 because these involve simple,
everyday business practices. On the other hand, another group of
provisions-those dealing with the warranty of merchantability,23
17. U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2.
18. See U.C.C. § 2-104, comment 2.
19. u.c.c. § 2-201.
20. U .c.c. § 2-205.
21. u.c.c. § 2-207.
22. u.c.c. § 2-209.

23.

u.c.c.

§

2-314.
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the retention of possession by a merchant seller,24 and the entrusting
of possession to a merchant who deals in goods of the kind25-requires a professional status as to particular kinds of goods, and this
would suggest that, with respect to these situations, a more restrictive definition of the term "merchant"-one limited in its application to those who, in the normal course of their business activity,
deal in the particular goods in question-should be employed. This
latter group of provisions bears out the fact that a farmer can be a
merchant in some situations and not in others. While it would appear that concerning the sections dealing with merchantability and
retention of possession a farmer should be considered a merchant if
the transaction in question involves farm products of the type he
usually raises, 26 he should not be deemed a merchant with respect
to situations involving section 2-403(2). Section 2-403(2) provides
that a "merchant" who is entrusted with goods of the type in which
he deals can transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. However, section 9-307(1) expressly
excepts a farmer selling farm products from those persons who may
sell goods to a buyer in the ordinary course of business free of any
security interest created by the seller. That is, a farmer cannot extinguish a valid lien on crops he is marketing by the mere act of
sale. If a farmer were considered a merchant under section 2-403(2),
it would seem that, contrary to the language of section 9-307(1), he
could invalidate a security interest in farm products entrusted to
him; a possible conflict between these provisions can be avoided by
denying the farmer merchant status under section 2-403(2).27
A third group of Code provisions-those dealing with general
contractual duties-applies specifically to persons who are merchants because they have special knowledge of either the commercial
practices or the particular goods involved.28 A farmer could also be
24. u.c.c. § 2-402(2).
25. u.c.c. § 2-403(2).
26. For purposes of these sections, merchant status should only be attributed to
a farmer who is experienced in the raising of the particular crop in question. That
is, a wheat farmer raising corn for the first time should not be held to have warranted
the merchantability of the latter crop, nor should a dairy farmer, who stores grain
for a neighbor be deemed to have been entrusted with possession of goods which
others might think he has authority to sell.
27. In order to avoid possible conflict and confusion, the Iowa legislature has
amended § 2-403(2). The following exception has been included after the language
quoted in the text:
However, any entrusting of farm products to a person engaged in farming operations shall not give the farmer the power to transfer all rights of the entruster
to a buyer in the ordinary course of business if the entruster perfects a security
interest as provided in Article 9.
IowA CoDE ANN. § 554.2403(2) (Supp. 1965). Thus, Iowa has expressly excepted farmers
from the operation of this particular "merchant" provision, in an attempt to make
more explicit what was obviously intended by the drafters of the Code.
28. This group includes § 2-103(l)(b), which provides that in the case of a merchant, "good faith" includes observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
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considered a merchant with respect to these provisions because of
either his experience in the commercial marketing of farm products
or because of the specialized knowledge he has of the products
themselves.
Because the court in the principal case placed unwarranted
reliance upon common law authority and failed to consider the
purpose underlying the particular Code provision in question, it is
doubtful that its decision will be given much weight outside the
state of Arkansas. 29 The decision, however, is evidence of the deeprooted feeling of the judiciary, primarily in agricultural states, to
offer protection to the proverbial "tillers of the soil." This attitude
is not surprising, for the Code itself has special provisions which
offer a measure of protection to the farmer. 30 However, to decide
that the farmer in the principal case was a merchant and as such
is denied the defense of the statute of frauds would not preclude
a judgment in his favor. The grain company would still have the
burden of proving both the existence of the oral agreement and its
terms.31 Indeed, to allow the defense in this particular situation
would be to permit the statute of frauds to be used as an instru•
ment of fraud. Assuming that an oral agreement had actually been
made and that the written integration of that agreement signed by
the grain company had been received by the farmer, the farmer
would be in a position to speculate on a contract to which the grain
company was bound from the moment it mailed the memorandum.32 If the market price fell below the contract price, the farmer
could produce the paper and hold the grain company to its contract,
whereas if the market price rose above the contract price, the farmer
could deny the existence of the contract and sell his crop on the
open market. The statute of frauds was never intended to sanction
the repudiation of promises actually made.33
Because of the importance of agriculture to our economy, to
deny that a farmer may be considered a merchant is to weaken condealing in the trade; §§ 2-327(I)(c), 2-603, 2-605, dealing generally with the responsibilities of merchant buyers to follow sellers' instructions; § 2-509, concerning risk of
loss; and § 2-609, providing adequate assurance of performance.
29. Although to date forty-seven states have adopted the U.C.C., the principal case
is the first reported decision examining the farmer-merchant question.
30. See U.C.C. § 9-204(4)(a).
31. U.C.C. § 2-201, comment 3.
32. U.C.C. § 2-201(1), makes it clear that the signed memorandum mailed to the
defendant bound the plaintiff contractually to the terms it contained. It appears that
the reason the defendant did not desire to hold the plaintiff to this contract, and
tried to avoid being bound to its terms himself, is that the price called for was $2.54
per bushel which was considerably below the market price for soybeans at the time
specified for delivery. The defendant could, therefore, sell his soybeans more profitably
elsewhere.
33. For a general discussion of the Statute of Frauds in the U.C.C., see Corbin,
The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950),
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siderably the Uniform Commercial Code as an instrument which
regulates the commercial affairs of the country. There does not appear to be any reason why the contractual dealings surrounding the
marketing of farm products should not be regulated by the same
laws that apply to other sales when all of the parties involved are
experienced in the type of transaction taking place.

